教学项目
教师与研究
学生发展
国际交流
校友
合作发展
研究机构
关于我们

全职师资

教师简历

李波

教育背景

加拿大女皇大学                     经济学        博士学位         2013.10    

加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学       经济学        硕士学位         2006.06   

加拿大西安大略大学              经济学        学士学位         2005.06 


工作经历

学术职位:

2021至今        清华大学五道口金融学院      副教授

2014-2021     清华大学五道口金融学院      助理教授


主要研究领域

政治经济、公司破产与重组、科技、风险投资、人力资本及培训


讲授课程 

博士实证公司金融,博士论文写作


荣誉及奖项

AWARDS, PRIZES AND HONORS

- China Financial Research Conference Best Paper Award                                                    2019

- Tsinghua University Award for Excellence in Online Teaching during the COVID                 2020


GRANTS

- Beijing Municipal Bureau of Commerce's Grant on Financial Indicators                               2022 

- Beijing Municipal Bureau of Commerce's Grant on Financial Indicators                               2021 

- National Natural Science Foundation of China: Chinese capital Market                               2018 

- Financial Innovation and Supervision in the Context of Globalization                                   2018


发表论文

Senior Lender Control: Monitoring Spillover or Creditor Conflict? (with Wei Wang and Lynnette Purda), Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 2018, 3, 373-411.

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of senior lender control, as measured by bank loan covenants,  on the pricing of new bond issues. We find a U-shaped relation between the number of financial  covenants on a firm’s loan contract and the bond yield spread. Our results suggest that bondholders  initially value the monitoring benefits derived from loan covenants; as lender control becomes  excessive, however, bondholders require compensation for the risk of losses due to creditor conflicts.  Our heterogeneity tests show that the positive relation between bond yield and loan covenants is  stronger when bond holding is more dispersed, for firms with higher default risk or better corporate  governance as well as in the absence of relationship lenders.


Going Bankrupt in China (with Jacopo Ponticelli), Review of Finance, forthcoming. 

Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable, Oxford Business Law Blog, Vox and Vox China  

Abstract: Using a new case-level dataset we document a set of stylized facts on bankruptcy in China  and study how the staggered introduction of specialized courts across Chinese cities affected insolvency resolution and the local economy. For identification, we compare bankruptcy cases handled by specialized versus traditional civil courts within the same city and filed in the same year. We find that specialized courts decrease case duration by 36% relative to traditional civil courts. We provide evidence consistent with court specialization increasing efficiency via selection of better trained judges and higher judicial independence from local politicians. We document that cities introducing specialized courts experience a relative reallocation of employment out of zombie firms-intensive sectors, as well as faster firm entry and a larger increase in average capital productivity.


工作论文

China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from SOEs to Non-SOEs (with  Zhengwei Wang and Hao Zhou), 2021, Review of Finance R&R.  

Abstract: This paper uses publicly released audit reports to study the effects of disclosing information  about corruption practices on credit market. We provide a novel empirical finding that the public disclosures during China’s recent anti-corruption crackdown lead to bank credit reallocation—from  less productive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive non-SOEs. We estimate both a  direct effect on implicated firms and a spillover effect within the exposed industries. Using hand-collected data set on the enforcement outcomes, we show that the audits operate via a deterrent effect  on lenders to avoid perceived costs of engaging in corruption, through the state-owned banks using  loan-level data. Firm investments are more responsive to released audit reports relative to governance  measures. However, the previous anti-corruption campaign is muted on a credit reallocation effect.  Our findings highlight the value of having a more informed audit program in enhancing efficiency in  credit market.


Technology Transfer and Early Industrial Development: Evidence from the Sino-Sovi Alliance (with Michela Giorcelli), 2021, NBER Working paper 29455. 

Abstract: This paper studies the causal effect of technology and knowledge transfers on early industrial development. Between 1950 and 1957, the Soviet Union supported the “156 Projects” in China for  the construction of technologically advanced, large-scale, capital-intensive industrial facilities. We exploit idiosyncratic delays in project completion and the unexpected end of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, due to which some projects received Soviet technology embedded in capital goods and know-how, while others were eventually realized by China alone using domestic technology. We find that receiving  both Soviet technology and know-how had large, persistent effects on plant performance, while the  effects of receiving only Soviet capital goods were short-lived. The intervention generated horizontal and vertical spillovers, as well as production reallocation from state-owned to privately owned  companies since the late 1990s.



The Political Economy of Anti-Bribery Enforcement (with Lauren Cohen), 2021, NBER Working paper 29624.

Abstract: This paper documents novel evidence on the influence of political incentives in the regulatory enforcement of foreign bribery. Using case-level data from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, we find strategic discretion in the timing of enforcement in the years leading up to a Senate election against foreign firms in the Senator’s state. The probability of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement action against foreign firms located in the state increase significantly, spiking 23%, but zero for U.S. firms domiciled in the same states. We use exogenous variation in the timing and geographic location of U.S. Congressional elections to establish identification of our effects at the fine geographic level. Larger discretion occurs in regions where foreign firms are larger global competitors of in- state firms, operate in locally important industries, and when Senators serve as the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Anti-bribery enforcement has electoral implications, leading to greater vote shares for the Senator in power, coupled with spikes in media coverage. Moreover, the cases pushed through against these foreign firms just prior to elections appear to be weaker cases. The enforcements result in real effects, as in response to strategic timing in enforcement, firms reallocate business segments and sales.


Investing with the Government: A Field Experiment in China (with Emanuele Colonnelli and Ernest Liu), 2021. 

Abstract: We study the demand for government participation in financial markets. Focusing on the venture capital and private equity industry in China, we design a non-deceptive field experiment in collaboration with the leading industry organization, through which we conduct 1,000 experimental surveys of both sides of the market: the capital investors (LPs) and the private firms that manage the invested capital by deploying it to high-growth firms (GPs). Our respondents together account for nearly $1 trillion in assets under management. Each respondent evaluates hypothetical profiles of potential investment partners, whose characteristics we randomize, under the real-stakes incentive that they will be introduced to real partners matching their preferences. We document that the average GP dislikes LPs with government ties, indicating that the benefits of political connections are small compared to the cons of having the government as an investor. To unpack channels, we show that such dislike is not present for government-owned GPs and conduct additional surveys of our respondents, which together suggest the presence of interference in decision-making to be a leading mechanism why government capital is unattractive to private GPs. On the other hand, we find that the average LP prefers GPs that have a government-related LP as an investor. To illustrate the importance of accounting for differential demand for government capital, we first establish two stylized facts using administrative data: government LPs are more likely to match with government-owned GPs, and government-owned GPs generate lower returns. We then discuss the equilibrium impact of government participation on market outcomes by developing a two-sided search and matching model  and conducting simple policy counterfactuals.


Borrowing from Friends of Friends: Indirect Social Networks and Bank Loans (with Sterling Huang, Massimo Massa and Hong Zhang), 2021. 

Abstract: We examine how indirect connections (i.e., friends of friends), an important yet understudied feature of social networks, may affect bank loan contracts. Based on the sample of loans issued by U.S. public firms, we find that indirect connections built on board interlocks can significantly reduce loan spreads. A novel difference-in-difference test exploiting the death and quasi-exogenous retirement of directors lends support to a causal interpretation. Bank monitoring, loan quality, and firm investments are negatively affected, suggesting that indirect connections may give rise to a favoritism treatment by  banks.


学术报告

Senior Lender Control: Monitoring Spillover or Creditor Conflict? (with Wei Wang and Lynnette Purda), Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 2018, 3, 373-411. 

Presented at Ivey-Smith workshop, American Law and Economics Association, CICF, Journal of  Law, Finance, and Accounting (JLFA), NFA, FMA 


Going Bankrupt in China (with Jacopo Ponticelli), Review of Finance, forthcoming. 

Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable, Oxford Business Law Blog, Vox and Vox China  

Presented at: NBER, AFA, Chicago Booth Political Economy of Finance Conference, SFS Cavalcade Asia, ABFER Singapore, NYU, Tsinghua University, CFRC, CICF, CKGSB 


China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from SOEs to Non-SOEs (with Zhengwei Wang and Hao Zhou), 2021, JFQA R&R.  

ProMarket Stigler 

Presented at: at NBER Summer Institute, CICF, CFRC, NYU, CREST Paris, Graduate Institute Geneva Workshop, MIT Golub Center for Finance and Policy, SFS Finance Cavalcade Asia-Pacific


Technology Transfer and Early Industrial Development: Evidence from the Sino-Soviet Alliance (with Michela Giorcelli), 2021, NBER Working paper 29455. 

Presented at: NBER Summer Institute on Productivity, Development and Entrepreneurship, AFA(scheduled), Harvard, UCLA, Yale University, University of British Columbia, University of Michigan, George Washington University, Auburn University, University of Oxford, LUISS, Universitá di Bologna, Universitá di Padova, University of Melbourne, Tsinghua University, the Cliometrics Conference, the NBER Productivity Lunch, the Second Women in International Economics (WIE) Conference, the CEPR/LEAP Workshop in Development Economics, the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum on the Economics of Science and Innovation, the Pacific Conference for Development Economics, the Webinar Series in Finance and Development (WEFIDEV), the LSE  Asia Economic History Seminar, the Online Economic History Workshop, and the Ridge Conference


The Political Economy of Anti-Bribery Enforcement (with Lauren Cohen), 2021. 

Presented at: AFA, POLFIN, CICF, EFA, ABFER Singapore, CIFER 


Investing with the Government: Evidence from Three Field Experiments (with Emanuele Colonnelli and Ernest Liu), 2021.

Presented at: UChicago, ABFER Capital Market (scheduled), EIEF, WEFIDEV, Tsinghua PBC 


Borrowing from Friends of Friends: Indirect Social Networks and Bank Loans (with Sterling Huang, Massimo Massa and Hong Zhang), 2021. 

Presented at: CICF, Five-Star Workshop in Finance 


The Externality of Debt Rollover: Evidence from Syndicated Lending, 2018. 

Presented at: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, CKGSB, Queen's University, NFA, MFA, Peking University, Tsinghua University


案例研究

Commercial Bank Loan Restructuring A and B, with Hong Zhang. December 2017. Tsinghua PBC Case  Series. PBC School of Finance Tsinghua University.  


Minfa Securities Bankruptcy Liquidation, with Hong Zhang. December 2017. Tsinghua PBC Case Series.  PBC School of Finance Tsinghua University.  


Alibaba Cloud: Finance and AI, with Xuexin Gao, and Hong Zhang. September 2016. Tsinghua PBC  Case Series. PBC School of Finance Tsinghua University.  


Shenzhou RideShare, with Xuexin Gao, and Hong Zhang. April 2016. Tsinghua PBC Case Series. PBC  School of Finance Tsinghua University.