【清华论坛暨清华五道口全球名师大讲堂】纽约大学Douglas Gale:银行监管的理论经济学探究 _学术活动_学术活动_教师与研究_清华大学五道口金融学院

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【清华论坛暨清华五道口全球名师大讲堂】纽约大学Douglas Gale:银行监管的理论经济学探究

时间:2018-05-29 来源: 作者: 浏览: 字号: 打印

清华论坛第七十九讲暨清华五道口全球名师大讲堂

Tsinghua Forum & Tsinghua PBCSF Global Academic Leader Forum

 

演讲主题: 银行监管的理论经济学探究

Theoretical Issues in Bank Regulation

演讲嘉宾: 道格拉斯·盖尔 Douglas Gale    

纽约大学Silver讲席教授

Silver Professor, New York University

Professor of Economics, New York University

时间20180529 上午10:00

地点:清华大学五道口金融学院3号楼300教室

演讲语言: 英文

主办单位:清华大学学术委员会、清华大学五道口金融学院

演讲人简介:

Professor Douglas Gale was Silver Professor at Department of Economics, New York University. He previously held position at University of Cambridge, London School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh, MIT and Boston University. He was made a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1987, was an Extraordinary Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge from 2003-06, and is currently a fellow of British Academy, a Senior Fellow of the Financial Institutions Center at the Wharton School and a Research Associate of the Financial Markets Group at the LSE. He has served on the editorial boards of Econometrica, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Research in Economics, Games and Economic Behavior and Review of Economic Studies. His research interests include the strategic foundations of general equilibrium; money and banking; experimental economics and theories of bounded rationality. He is the author of several books and a large number of articles on economic theory and financial economics, which have appeared in leading journals.

 

报告摘要:

In the history of bank regulation, major innovations tend to follow financial crises. This was true of the Overend and Gurney crisis, the Crisis of 1907, the Great Depression and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. Politicians take up the cry that “something must be done” and economic theory takes a while to catch up. The current regulatory regime is an attempt to make the banking system more resilient, but it lacks theoretical foundations. This is unfortunate, because stability is not the only objective: regulation should also aim to create an efficient, competitive, and stable financial system. In the same way that the classical theorems of welfare economics provide an ideal model of a well-functioning market system, an ideal model of a well-functioning banking system can help us understand what kind of regulation is needed. As a step towards this goal, I describe recent developments in the theory of bank capital structure, liquidity management, and maturity transformation.

 

参会条件:本次会议为学术会议,仅面向高校师生与金融研究人员

参会方式:

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http://tsinghuaforum79.events.pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn

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