Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study Evidence from China（反腐改革与股东估值：由中国事件研究得到的启示）
主讲人：Bernard Y. Yeung，新加坡国立大学商学院Stephen
with reduced expected corruption adding value overall, Chinese shares rise
sharply on the December 4th 2012 launch of major anti-corruption reforms
starting with curtailing extravagant spending by or for Party cadres. SOEs gain
broadly, consistent with the reform cutting their top managers’ (all Party
cadres) spending on private benefits. NonSOEs gain in more liberalized
provinces, consistent with reduced expected bribes to officials (also Party
cadres) for getting business done. NonSOEs lose in provinces where market
institutions remain weak, consistent with bribes for “greasing bureaucratic
gears” still being a key resource allocation mechanism there. Firm level
regressions reveal more productive nonSOEs in more growth potential and
external finance-dependent industries gaining more in more liberalized
provinces, consistent with investors expecting reduced corruption to improve
resource allocation more where market institutions are more developed.
Professor Bernard Yeung is the Dean and Stephen Riady Distinguished Professor in Finance and Strategic Management and President of the Asia Bureau of Finance and Economic Research at National University of Singapore (NUS) Business School. Before joining NUS in June 2008, he was the Abraham Krasnoff Professor in Global Business, Economics, and Management at New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business. He has also served as the Director of the NYU China House, the honorary co-chair of the Strategy Department of the Peking University Guanghua School of Management.
He received his Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Mathematics from the University of Western Ontario and his MBA and PhD degrees from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago. Professor Yeung has published widely in academic journals and his writing also appears in top-tier media publications such as The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal.