Do Unions Affect Innovation?

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Abstract. We examine the effect of unionization on firm innovation, using a regression discontinuity design that relies on “locally” exogenous variation generated by elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. Passing a union election results in an 8.7% (12.5%) decline in patent quantity (quality) three years after the election. A reduction in R&D expenditures, reduced productivity of inventors, and departures of innovative inventors appear to be plausible underlying mechanisms through which unionization impedes firm innovation. In response to unionization, firms move their innovation activities away from states where union elections win. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of unionization.

Keywords: innovation • labor unions • hold-up • shirking • inventor departures

1. Introduction

In this paper, we study the effect of labor unions on firm innovation. The impact of unions on innovation is of particular interest to policy makers and firm stakeholders not only because innovation is a crucial driver of economic growth (Solow 1957), but also because unions in the United States are regulated and can be altered by labor laws and regulations over time. Although unions are mainly joined by blue-collar workers, they could have both direct and indirect effects on firm innovation (see a more detailed discussion in Section 2.1). This potentially important role played by blue-collar workers in the innovation process has been generally ignored by the previous literature but has recently received some attention as of late.1 In this paper, we propose two competing hypotheses developed from the prevailing views of unionization to examine the effect of unions on firm innovation activities.

Our first hypothesis argues that unions promote innovation. Motivating innovation is a challenge for most firms and organizations. Unlike routine tasks such as marketing or mass production, innovation involves a long process that is idiosyncratic, uncertain, and has a high probability of failure (Holmstrom 1989). Therefore, providing employees with protection against dismissal in bad faith is necessary to effectively motivate and nurture innovation. Acharya et al. (2014) study wrongful discharge laws in the United States and their impact on innovation.2 They show that wrongful discharge laws, particularly those that protect employees for termination in bad faith, foster innovation vis-à-vis increased employee effort. To the extent that unions provide employees with perhaps the strongest form of protection against termination, unions could promote firm innovation. We term this view the “employee protectionism hypothesis.”

The employee protectionism hypothesis appears to be consistent with the implications of the theoretical model in Manso (2011), who suggests that contracts that tolerate failure motivate innovation. This is because unions provide employees with job security and thus by the essence of the union contract provide implicit tolerance from failure. However, this argument ignores the fact that the contract design in Manso (2011) that best motivates innovation requires a combination of tolerance for failure in the short term and reward for success in the long term. Unions do not provide long-term rewards, such as stock options, participation in royalties, etc., to workers for success. Hence, the model in Manso (2011) does not support the employee protectionism hypothesis.

An alternative hypothesis makes the opposite empirical prediction. Unionization may create misaligned incentives among employees and impede firm innovation. There are at least three plausible reasons for such a reduction in innovation. First, because innovation requires considerable investment in intangible assets such as research and development (R&D), contracts that effectively motivate innovation are almost always incomplete. Once the investment has been made and the innovation process begins, workers may have incentives to expropriate rents by demanding higher wage concessions, recognizing that the costs are sunk. This ex post hold-up problem on the part
of employees in turn leads to an ex ante under-investment in R&D (Grout 1984, Malcomson 1997), which ultimately impedes innovation. Second, unionizing the workforce could encourage shirking because the negative consequences for supplying less effort are reduced. That is, unionization reduces the probability of dismissal, so it lowers the cost of shirking and could lead to lower productivity among workers. Third, unions alter the distribution of worker wages, leading to a reduction in wage inequality among workers (Frandsen 2012). To the extent that innovative and talented workers are in demand in the labor market, reduced wage gaps may force out innovative employees, which contributes to the decline in innovation in unionized firms. Although the three underlying mechanisms discussed are different, they are all related in the sense that unionization creates misaligned incentives and impedes innovation. We refer to the general decline in innovation after unionization stemming from any one or all of these potential consequences as the “misaligned incentives hypothesis.”

We test the above two hypotheses by examining whether unions promote or impede firm innovation. Following existing literature that uses patenting data to capture firms’ innovativeness (i.e., Aghion et al. 2005, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2013, Seru 2014), we use the number of patents granted to a firm and the number of future citations received by each patent obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Citation database to measure innovation output. The former captures the quantity of firm innovation, and the latter captures the quality of firm innovation. We collect union election results from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which allows us to compare changes in innovation output for firms that elect to become unionized to those that vote against it. The empirical challenge of our study is to identify the causal effect of unionization on firm innovation. A standard ordinary least squares (OLS) approach that regresses innovation output on a unionization variable suffers from potentially severe identification problems. Union election results could be correlated with firm unobservable characteristics that affect firm innovation output (the omitted variable concern) or firms with low innovation potential may be more likely to pass unionization elections (the reverse causality concern). Both problems could make it difficult to draw causal inferences from unionization to innovation. To attempt to establish causality, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that relies on “locally” exogenous variation in unionization generated by these elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. This approach compares firms’ innovation output subsequent to union elections that pass to those that do not pass by a small margin. It is a powerful and appealing identification strategy because, for these close-call elections, passing is very close to an independent, random event and therefore is unlikely to be correlated with firm unobservable characteristics.

After performing various diagnostic tests to ensure that the key identifying assumptions of the RDD are satisfied, we show that unionization has a negative effect on firm innovation. According to our nonparametric local linear regression estimation, passing a union election leads to an 8.7% decline in patent counts and a 12.5% decline in patent citations three years after the election. This result is robust to alternative choices of kernels and bandwidths and is absent at artificially chosen thresholds that determine union election outcomes. The negative effect of unionization on innovation is present in both manufacturing (where most unions form) and nonmanufacturing industries, but it is statistically insignificant in firms located in states with right-to-work legislation where unions have less power to expropriate rents. We show that a cut in R&D spending, reduced productivity of current and newly hired inventors, and the departure of innovative inventors are possible underlying mechanisms through which unionization impedes firm innovation. Finally, we find that firms shift innovation activities away from states where union elections are successful.

We are not the first to study this topic. The impact of unions on productivity and efficiency has been studied for decades. For instance, in their influential paper, “The Two Faces of Unionism,” Freeman and Medoff (1979) provide a summary of two opposing views on the matter. The collective voice view advocates the positive effects of unions on productivity, suggesting that they reduce employee turnover, improve morale and cooperation among workers, and allow for the implementation of better policies that reflect the aggregate preferences of all employees. The monopolistic view, however, paints a negative picture of unions in that they raise wages above the equilibrium level, encourage shirking, and lower society’s output because of the ability (and realization) of workers to go on strike.3

Perhaps in between these views, DiNardo and Lee (2004) study the impact of unions on productivity, survival, wages, sales, and sales per worker. Using a similar empirical approach to the one we adopt in this paper, they find that unions have very little economic impact on these outcome variables. Although both DiNardo and Lee (2004) and Freeman and Medoff (1979) focus more on the broader impact of unionization on firm productivity, our interest is in innovation. Innovation is the exploration of the unknown and untested, and therefore the risk profile and potential payoff are much different than that in conventional investment in capital expenditures (Holmstrom 1989). Several recent papers indicate that economic forces can impact capital expenditures and innovation in very different ways.
For instance, an extant literature indicates that companies go public to raise capital to presumably invest in innovative projects. However, Bernstein (2015) suggests that going public hinders innovation because these newly public firms substitute investments in innovation for investments in acquisitions and other conventional forms of investment. The evidence in Derrien and Kecskes (2013) suggests that financial analysts reduce information asymmetry and hence the cost of capital, which leads to increases in capital expenditures. However, He and Tian (2013) show that analysts stifle innovation because analysts impose short-term pressure on managers to meet earnings targets. Other research has specifically focused on unions and innovation, but with mixed results.

We differ from the existing literature in at least three important dimensions. First, and perhaps most importantly, we use RDD as our main identification strategy, allowing us to establish a likely causal link between unionization and innovation, which the existing literature has not adequately addressed. Second, studies focusing on unionization and innovation almost exclusively use R&D expenditures as a proxy for innovation, which is only one input to innovation. Instead, our main focus is on innovation output: a firm’s patenting activity. Third, we make an attempt to pinpoint possible underlying economic mechanisms through which unions affect firm innovation and how firms respond to union election wins.

Our paper is timely because labor laws significantly reducing organized labor’s power have either been considered or become law in several states recently. For instance, in March 2013, right-to-work laws were enacted in the state of Michigan, prohibiting membership and financial support of a labor union as preconditions of employment. This controversial legislation generated a significant amount of media attention not only because of the enormous power and presence of labor unions in Michigan, but because the legal, political, and economic ramifications in this state and beyond are enormous, particularly as other states grapple with passing similar laws. In a highly publicized case, in 2009 Boeing decided to expand into South Carolina to manufacture its new Dreamliner airplane rather than expanding its existing facility in Washington. South Carolina is a right-to-work state whereas Washington is not. The CEO was cited as saying that the reason for the move was because the company couldn’t afford to have “strikes happening every three to four years” (Wall Street Journal 2011).

The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses background and related literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides our main results. Section 5 investigates underlying economic mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
to the innovation process. It is also consistent with the Nobel Prize work of Hayek (1945), who suggests that no one person has the knowledge or expertise to make an innovative idea come to fruition: “practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation” (pp. 521, 522).

In addition to direct effects caused by unionizing, blue-collar workers may have indirect effects on nonunionized scientists or engineers in the R&D center via spillovers. Greater employee protections afforded by unions may facilitate workers’ providing of more input and ideas because they are not afraid to voice their opinions, leading to innovation gains. On the other hand, floor workers may demand wage concessions after they are unionized, drying out resources available to innovative scientists. Also, floor workers often serve as supporting staff for scientists and engineers. These workers can reduce the innovation productivity of researchers if they shirk or frequently engage in strikes. Finally, unionization alters the wage distribution among workers and reduces wage inequality, which may force the most talented and innovative workers to pursue better career opportunities outside of the firm. All of these views are consistent with the theme in Hayek (1945).

### 2.2. Relation to the Existing Literature

Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, our paper is related to the emerging literature that focuses on various determinants of innovation. Theoretical work from Holmstrom (1989) argues that innovation activities may mix poorly with routine activities in an organization. Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggest that the organizational structure of firms matters for innovation. Manso (2011) argues that managerial contracts that tolerate failure in the short run and reward success in the long run are best suited for motivating innovation. The model of Ferreira et al. (2014) suggests that a firm’s ownership structure affects innovation.

Empirical evidence shows that various firm and industry characteristics affect managerial incentives of investing in innovation. A larger institutional ownership (Aghion et al. 2013), private instead of public equity ownership (Lerner et al. 2011), lower stock liquidity (Fang et al. 2014), and corporate rather than traditional venture capitalists (Chemmanur et al. 2014) alter managerial incentives and hence help to nurture innovation. Other studies show that product market competition, market conditions, firm boundaries, banking competition, CEO overconfidence, external financial dependence, basic education of workers, and investors’ attitudes toward failure all affect firm innovation (Aghion et al. 2005; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2013, 2017; Hirshleifer et al. 2012; D’Acunto 2014; Seru 2014; Tian and Wang 2014; Cornaggia et al. 2015, Bloom et al. 2016).

Acharya et al. (2014) examine labor laws and their impact on innovation. They find that employee representation, which is one component of labor laws dealing with the right to form unions, is negatively related to innovation. Our paper has a different angle: we use union election results to identify the effect of unionization on innovation.

Second, our paper adds to the voluminous literature about the costs and benefits of labor unions. This literature generally shows that unions can influence both the investment and financing decisions of firms. Klasa et al. (2009) argue that firms in unionized industries strategically hold less cash to maintain bargaining leverage with unions. Likewise, Bronars and Deere (1991), Hanka (1998), and Matsa (2010) find that firms that are unionized are more likely to use financial leverage because it allows unionized firms to shield their cash flows from union demands. He et al. (2014) find that unionized firms pay fewer dividends and buy back fewer shares because of increased operating risk. Chen et al. (2011, 2012) find that the cost of equity is significantly higher in more unionized industries but the cost of debt is lower in these industries. Lee and Mas (2012) show negative abnormal returns over a long period to union victories, implying that unionization destroys shareholder wealth. Chyz et al. (2013) find that unionized firms are less likely to engage in aggressive tax strategies. Tian and Wang (2015) show that labor unions deter takeover bids.

Several papers directly examine the impact of labor unions on investment. Collectively, the evidence leans toward a negative union–investment relation. Grout (1984) and Malcomson (1997) implicitly assume that unionized firms underinvest because of the hold-up problem. Connolly et al. (1986) show that intangible R&D investments in unionized firms add less to market value than those in nonunionized firms. However, DiNardo and Lee (2004) find that unions have a small impact on business survival, employment, output, productivity, and wages.

The only two studies we are aware of that directly examine the relation between unionization and innovation using U.S. data are Acs and Audretsch (1988) and Hirsch and Link (1987). Acs and Audretsch (1988) find a negative association between union rates and counts of innovations based on one year of data (i.e., 1982) at the industry level. Hirsch and Link (1987) also find a negative association between union rates and innovation based on 315 New York manufacturing firms in 1985 using firm responses to surveys on product innovation. Different from their work, ours examines the likely causal effect of unionization on innovation at the firm level with a much longer time series, using a newly
assembled sample of NLRB union elections matched to the NBER patent and citation data.

3. Data and Descriptive Statistics

Our data are from several sources. We collect union election results data from the NLRB over 1980–2002, which only covers private sector employees. It contains firm name, location, SIC code, the date of the election, the number of participants, and outcomes of the voting. We initially begin with 128,351 unique elections. We eliminate observations if the election voting outcome is not available or if the number of employees participating in the election is less than 100, consistent with Lee and Mas (2012). We then manually match these firms by firm name with the NBER for both publicly traded and privately held firms. We are careful to ensure accurate matches by requiring that the firm’s headquarter location and one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code also match for publicly traded firms when this information is available. In the case where there are multiple elections occurring within a three-year period for a unique firm, we retain the outcome from the first election. Our final sample contains 8,809 unique union elections.

We “proxy” for firm innovativeness using patent information from the NBER Patent Citation database (see Hall et al. 2001 for more detailed discussion about the database). This database contains all patents (for both product and process innovation) registered and granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) over the 1976–2006 time period. It provides annual information on patent assignee names, the number of patents, the number of citations received by each patent, and a patent’s application and grant year, etc. Thus, we merge all patent data registered to firms in our union election sample.

To gauge a firm’s innovativeness, we construct two measures. The first measure is a firm’s total number of patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted. We relate a patent’s application year instead of its grant year to a firm’s union election year because previous studies (such as Griliches et al. 1988) have shown that the former is superior in capturing the actual time of innovation. Although patent counts are straightforward and easy to calculate, they cannot distinguish groundbreaking innovation from incremental technological discoveries. Therefore, to assess a patent’s impact, we construct a second measure of firm innovativeness by counting the total number of non-self-citations each patent receives in subsequent years. Given a firm’s size and its innovation inputs, patent counts capture its overall innovation quantity, and the number of non-self-citations per patent captures the significance and quality of its innovation output. To account for the long-term nature of the innovation process, our empirical tests relate labor unions and other characteristics in the current year to the above two measures of innovation output in one, two, and three years following election results.

Consistent with the existing literature, we correct for two truncation problems associated with the NBER Patent Citation database. First, there is a substantial lag between patent applications and patent grants because the approval process typically takes several years (the lag between a patent’s application year and its grant year is approximately two years on average). Thus, toward the end of the sample period, particularly in the last two to three years, there is a significant decline in patent applications that are ultimately granted. Following Hall et al. (2001), we correct for this truncation bias in patent counts using the “weight factors” computed from the application–grant empirical distribution. Second, it usually takes time for a patent to generate citations, but we observe at best the citations received up to 2006. To alleviate these concerns, we use the shape of the citation–lag distribution advocated by Hall et al. (2001).

Panel A of Table 1 describes the union election and innovation data. Aggregating the votes from the 8,809 elections in our sample, 48% are in favor of unionization divided by total votes for unionization in a given election.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Election and innovation statistics</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union election statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote for union</td>
<td>8,809</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage</td>
<td>8,809</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Innovation statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents</td>
<td>8,809</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citations/Patents</td>
<td>8,809</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Industry statistics</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIC</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>No. of elections</td>
<td>Passage</td>
<td>No. of patents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Light Manuf.</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Heavy Manuf.</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Transp.</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Health Service</td>
<td>1,790</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Public admin.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes. This table presents descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A reports union election statistics and innovation measures. Panel B reports industry statistics. Vote for union is the total number of votes for unionization divided by total votes for unionization in a given election. Passage is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is unionized as a result of an election and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. Patent data are from the NBER Patent Citation database over the 1980–2005 time period.
ization with a standard deviation of 23%. The unionization passage rate is 36%, which suggests that on average approximately one-third of all elections favor unions. The average firm generates approximately 0.34 patents and the average patent generates 0.52 citations. This is lower than what is typically reported in the literature because our sample includes a mix of publicly traded and privately held firms, whereas existing studies in the literature rely on public firms because these firms have accounting and financial data available. Public firms are much larger with greater financial resources and thus own more patents. The distribution of patent grants and citations is right-skewed. Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of the patent counts and the natural logarithm of the number of citations per patent as the main innovation measures in our analysis. To avoid losing firm-year observations with zero patents or citations per patent, we add one to the actual values when calculating the natural logarithm.

Panel B of Table 1 provides an industry distribution of key variables. Not surprisingly, the bulk of elections are concentrated in the manufacturing industry (one-digit SIC codes of 2 and 3, light and heavy manufacturing, respectively). The highest passage rates are in the health services industry (one-digit SIC code of 8) whereas the lowest are in heavy manufacturing.

Figure 1 plots a time series of union election frequencies and passage rates across our sample period. There is a considerable spike followed by a sharp decline in the number of firms holding union elections in the early 1980s. Beyond this period, there is a gradual increase that continues to trend between approximately 300 and 400 elections per year. The second plot in Figure 1 shows passage rates for union elections across time. There is considerable variation through time, but in each year the majority of union elections fail to pass.

4. RDD and Main Results
We present our main empirical strategy and results in this section. Section 4.1 discusses our empirical strategy and reports various diagnostic tests for the validity of using regression discontinuity design (RDD). Section 4.2 presents our main RDD results. Section 4.3 reports a variety of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of the main results. Section 4.4 considers industry membership and Section 4.5 examines how right-to-work legislation alters the main results.

4.1. Empirical Strategy and Diagnostic Tests
A naive approach to evaluate the effect of unionization on firm innovation is to estimate the following model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) in a firm-year panel:

$$\ln(\text{Innovation}_{i,t}) = \alpha + \beta \text{Unionization}_{i,t} + \gamma' Z_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

(1)

where $i$ indexes firm, $t$ indexes time, and $N = 1, 2, 3$. The dependent variable, Innovation, is one of our two main innovation variables: patent counts or the number of citations per patent. The variable of interest is Unionization, which is a binary variable that equals one if the union election leads to unionization, and zero if the union election fails to lead to unionization. $Z$ is a vector of observable determinants of a firm’s innovation output.

However, firm unobservable characteristics related with both union election results and innovation could bias the results (omitted variables), or firms with low innovation potential may be more likely to pass union elections (reverse causality). Thus, $\beta$ cannot be interpreted as a causal effect of unionization. To address the identification concern, we use RDD that rests on the assignment of a firm’s unionization status based on a simple majority (50%) passing rule and exploits a unique feature of the union election data: we observe the percentage vote for unionization in every union election.

The RDD relies on “locally” exogenous variation in unionization generated by union elections that pass or fail by a small margin of votes around the 50% threshold. Conceptually, this empirical approach compares firms’ innovation output subsequent to union elections
that pass by a small margin to those union elections that do not pass by a small margin. It is a powerful and appealing identification strategy because, for these close-call elections, randomized variation in firm unionization status is a consequence of the RDD, which helps us to identify the effect of unionization on firm innovation. Another advantage of the RDD is that we do not have to include observable covariates, \( Z \), in the analysis because the inclusion of covariates is unnecessary for identification (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Thus, we are able to include privately held firms in our sample, which have limited firm-specific information available.

A key identifying assumption of the RDD is that agents (both voters and employers in our setting) cannot precisely manipulate the forcing variable (i.e., the number of votes) near the known cutoff (Lee and Lemieux 2010).\(^\text{12}\) If this identifying assumption is satisfied, the variation in union recognition status is as good as that from a randomized experiment. To check the validity of this assumption, we perform two diagnostic tests.

First, Figure 2 shows a histogram of the sample distribution of union vote shares in 40 equally spaced vote share bins (with a bin width of 2.5%), and the \( x \) axis represents the percentage of votes favoring unionization. If there is systematic sorting of firms within close proximity of the threshold, this sorting would be observed by a discontinuity in the vote share distribution at the 50% vote threshold. The figure shows that the vote share distribution is continuous within close proximity of the cutoff, and thus no evidence of precise manipulation is observed at the cutoff point.

**Figure 2.** (Color online) Distribution of Votes

\( N \)otes. This figure plots a histogram of the distribution of the number of elections with the percentage of votes for unionizing in our sample across 40 equally spaced bins (with a 2.5% bin width). For instance, there are approximately 100 union elections that generate between 12.5% and 15% votes in support for unionizing as shown in the figure. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002.

Second, we follow McCrary (2008) and provide a formal test of a discontinuity in the density. Using the two-step procedure developed in McCrary (2008), Figure 3 plots the density of union vote shares.\(^\text{13}\) The \( x \) axis represents the percentage of votes favoring unionization. The dots depict the density and the solid line represents the fitted density function of the forcing variable (i.e., the number of votes) with a 95% confidence interval around the fitted line. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002.

**Figure 3.** Density of Union Vote Shares

\( N \)otes. This figure plots the density of union vote shares following the procedure in McCrary (2008). The \( x \) axis is the percentage of votes favoring unionization. The dots depict the density estimate. The solid line represents the fitted density function of the forcing variable (the number of votes) with a 95% confidence interval around the fitted line. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002.

Another important assumption of the RDD is that there should not be discontinuity in other covariates that are correlated with firm innovation at the cutoff point. In other words, firms that vote to unionize should not be systematically different ex ante from firms that vote not to unionize. We perform this diagnostic test by comparing the covariates of firms that fall in a narrow band of vote shares [48%, 52%] around the winning threshold. Therefore, we are comparing firms that win or lose by a very small margin. Although our sample consists of both privately held and publicly traded firms, we must rely on the sample of publicly traded firms for which accounting data exist to examine various dimensions of firm characteristics for firms that elect and do not elect to unionize. The appendix provides a detailed description of variable definitions.
Figure 4. Regression Discontinuity Plots

Notes. This figure presents regression discontinuity plots using a fitted quadratic polynomial estimate with a 95% confidence interval around the fitted value. The x-axis is the percentage of votes favoring unionization. The dots depict the average innovation outcome variables in each of 40 equally spaced bins (with a bin width of 2.5%). Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. Patent data are from the NBER Patent Citation database over the 1980–2005 time period.

We report the results in Table 2. Observable covariates including firm size (Ln(Assets)), growth opportunities (Ln(1 + BM)), profitability (ROA), asset tangibility (PPE/Assets), routine investment (Capx/Assets), leverage (Debt/Assets), and firm age (Ln(1 + Firm age)) in the union election year are similar between firms that barely unionize and those that barely elect to not unionize. More importantly, we do not observe that the innovation outcome variables, Ln(Patents) and Ln(Citations/Patent), are significantly different across these two groups of firms in the union election year.
Overall, the diagnostic tests presented above suggest that there does not appear to be a precise manipulation by voters or employers within close proximity of the 50% threshold. Further, there is no discontinuity in other covariates at the cutoff point.

4.2. Main RDD Results

We present the main RDD results in this subsection. Because the innovation process generally takes considerable time, we examine the effect of unionization on firms’ patenting activities one, two, and three years after the election. We first present RDD results in Figure 4 to visually check the relation around the cutoff. The left-hand plots present the number of patents and the right-hand plots present the number of citations per patent (both are logarithmically transformed). The x axis represents the percentage of votes for unionization. We once again divide the spectrum of vote shares into 40 equally spaced bins (with a bin width of 2.5%).

In all plots displayed, firms that fail in unionizing are to the left of the 50% threshold and firms that succeed in unionizing are to the right of the threshold. The dots depict the average value of innovation outcome variables in the bins. The solid line represents the fitted quadratic polynomial estimate with a 95% confidence interval around the fitted value.

Figure 4 shows a discontinuity in both patent counts and the number of citations per patent at the threshold in each of the three years after the union election. Specifically, within close proximity of the threshold, patent counts and citations drop significantly once the percentage of votes in favor of unionization crosses the 50% cutoff point. This observation points to a likely negative effect of unionization on firm innovation.

We next present the regression discontinuity analysis with an estimation of a global polynomial series model (e.g., Cuñat et al. 2012), using the entire support of all union election observations in our sample. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

\[
\ln(\text{Innovation}_{i,s,t}) = \alpha + \beta \text{Unionization}_{i,s} + P_i(v,c) + P_i(v,c) + Y_{i,s} + \text{Ind}_{i,s} + \text{State}_{i,s} + \varepsilon
\]

where \( t \) indexes time, \( j \) indexes industry, \( i \) indexes firm, \( v \) is a total vote share (percentage of votes in favor). Because union elections win with a simple majority of support among the voters, \( c \) equals 50% in our setting. Year, three-digit SIC industry, and state fixed effects are included in the estimation.

In this estimation, \( \beta \) is the key variable of interest and its magnitude is estimated by the difference in these two smoothed functions at the cutoff, which captures the effect of passing a union election on firm innovation output \( N (N = 1, 2, \text{or} 3) \) years later. Note, however, that because RDD estimates are essentially weighted average treatment effects where the weights are the ante probability that the value of an individual union election falls in the neighborhood of the win threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010), this coefficient should be interpreted locally in the immediate vicinity of the win cutoff. Thus, caution needs to be used because one of the limitations of RDD is that, although it has strong local validity, its external validity is weak.

We present the results estimating various forms of Equation (2) in Table 3. We report the result with polynomials of order three, but our results are qualitatively similar using other polynomial orders. In panel A, we control for year and three-digit SIC industry fixed effects. The coefficient estimates on Unionization are all negative and statistically significant in all years, suggesting a negative effect of unionization on innovation output. Economically, when innovation output three years after the election is the dependent variable, the estimates suggest that passing a union election leads to a 9.8% decline in patent quantity and an 11.8% decline in patent quality. In panel B, we also include state fixed effects to address concerns that there might be unobservable state heterogeneity that drives our results. We observe both quantitatively and qualitatively similar results.

Although the results from the global polynomial estimation using all union election data suggest that there likely exists a negative effect of unionization on firm innovation, Bakke and Whited (2012) point out the importance of using a local linear estimation technique
because of RDD’s strong local, but weak external validity. Fan and Gijbels (1992) and Hahn et al. (2001) suggest that local linear estimations are rate optimal and have attractive bias properties. Therefore, we employ a nonparametric local linear estimation in the neighborhood around the 50% threshold, using the optimal bandwidth defined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) that minimizes the mean squared error (MSE) in a sharp regression discontinuity setting. In Table 4, we report the local linear estimation results using both a rectangular and triangular kernel.\(^\text{17}\)

The coefficient estimates on \textit{Unionization} are all negative and significant at the 1% level across all columns, consistent with the findings from the global polynomial estimation. The magnitudes of the coefficients are also very comparable to those reported in Table 3. Specifically, in the top panel of Table 4, based on the estimation using a rectangular kernel, a union election win leads to an 8.7% decline in patent quantity and a 12.5% decline in patent quality three years after the election. The corresponding values using a triangular kernel are similar (a drop of 8.9% and 12.1%, respectively). Overall, the evidence presented in this subsection suggests a negative effect of unionization on firm innovation.\(^\text{18}\) These findings are consistent with the misaligned incentives hypothesis.

### 4.3. Robustness Checks

We perform a variety of robustness checks that examine the sensitivity of our RDD results. First, we examine whether our local linear estimates are robust to alternative bandwidths. The choice of bandwidth reflects a trade-off between precision and bias. Using a wider bandwidth includes more observations and yields more precise estimates. However, a wider bandwidth can bias the estimates because the linear specification is less likely to be accurate. The reverse occurs if we use a narrower bandwidth. Therefore, we perform the first robustness test to ensure that our results are not sensitive to alternative bandwidths.

Specifically, we repeat the regression for different bandwidths around the threshold with a triangular kernel and plot the results in Figure 5. The \textit{x} axis represents bandwidths where “100” represents the optimal bandwidth based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and used in the estimations reported in Table 4, “200” represents twice the optimal bandwidth, and so forth. The left-hand figures plot the number of patents and the right-hand figures plot the number of citations.
per patent. The solid line represents the RDD estimators, and the dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

From Figure 5, we observe that the RDD estimates are always negative and are stable in both economic and statistical significance over the spectrum of bandwidth choices, suggesting that the baseline RDD results using local linear regressions are robust to alternative choices of bandwidths. We observe a similar pattern if we use a rectangular kernel instead.

Next, we do a series of placebo tests to check if we are still able to observe a discontinuity in innovation output at artificially chosen thresholds that are different from the true 50% threshold. We first randomly select an alternative threshold along the spectrum of union vote shares between 0 and 1 other than 0.5. We then assume it is the threshold that determines union election outcomes and reestimate the local linear model with a triangular kernel. We repeat this placebo estimation 1,000 times and plot a histogram of the distribution of the RDD estimates from these placebo tests in Figure 6. We also include a dashed vertical line that represents the RDD estimate at the true threshold reported in Table 4.

The histogram is centered at zero, which is consistent with the conjecture that the treatment effect of unionization on firm innovation is absent at artificially chosen vote thresholds. It also suggests that the negative effect of unionization on firm innovation we document is unlikely driven by chance, and therefore our RDD estimates are unlikely spurious.

Finally, a reasonable concern is that the majority of firms in our sample do not generate patents. To address this potential issue, we exclude firms that have never generated a patent in the sample period and redo the analysis in the RDD framework. We find qualitatively similar results, suggesting that our results are not driven by firms that are not innovative.

### 4.4. Industry Analysis

Having established a negative effect of unionization on the innovation activities of firms, we examine if industry membership plays a role. Panel B of Table 1 illustrates that the bulk of union elections are concentrated in one-digit SIC codes 2 and 3, which are the manufacturing sectors of the economy. We next explore the impact of unionization on firm innovation between manufacturing versus nonmanufacturing industries.

Table 5 reports these results. We define manufacturing as firms with one-digit SIC codes of 2 or 3; otherwise firms are classified as nonmanufacturing. We report the results for manufacturing firms in the top panel and for nonmanufacturing firms in the bottom panel. We use the local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and a triangular kernel. We verify that the results are consistent using alternative bandwidths and kernels.

Across both sets of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms, innovation production declines in each year following unionization. Economically, the estimates are roughly the same for both types of industries, although the effects are generally slightly smaller in nonmanufacturing firms. Thus, the evidence suggests that unionization has a negative effect on innovation in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries.

### 4.5. Right-to-Work Legislation

As discussed in the introduction of the paper, states that have adopted right-to-work legislation cannot force employees to join the union and pay union dues as preconditions of employment. Therefore, in right-to-work states, unions have considerably less bargaining power than in non-right-to-work states. A potential consequence of weaker union bargaining power is that a unionized workforce in a right-to-work state will have less of an impact on innovation than in states with-
out similar legislation. We test this conjecture in this subsection.

Table 6 reports the results for firms with union elections located in right-to-work states compared to those located in states without right-to-work legislation, using local linear RDD estimations as in Table 4. The top panel presents the results for firms located in right-to-work states, and the bottom panel reports the results for firms located in states without right-to-work legislation.¹⁹

In states with right-to-work laws, we find that the coefficient estimates on Unionization are negative but statistically insignificant across all three post-election years for innovation measures gauging quantity and quality. On the other hand, reported in the bottom panel of Table 6, firms winning union elections in
states without right-to-work legislation (which affords unions more bargaining power) have a large economic and statistical impact on innovation output. Specifically, in each postelection year for both patent counts and citations, the coefficient estimates on Unionization are negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that unionization leads to a decline in innovation output.

5. Underlying Mechanisms and Firm Response

We find pervasive evidence favoring the misaligned incentives hypothesis. In this section, we explore possible underlying economic mechanisms through which this occurs. A cut to R&D spending could be an underlying mechanism. Because unionized workers have incentives to expropriate rents once the innovation pro-
Table 5. Manufacturing and Nonmanufacturing Industries

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionization</td>
<td>Manufacturing industries (one-digit SIC codes 2 and 3)</td>
<td>Nonmanufacturing industries (one-digit SIC codes 0–1, 4–9)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 1</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>-0.082***</td>
<td>-0.101***</td>
<td>-0.073*</td>
<td>-0.115**</td>
<td>-0.133**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.96)</td>
<td>(-2.86)</td>
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<td>(-1.68)</td>
<td>(-2.28)</td>
<td>(-3.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 2</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
<td>-0.088***</td>
<td>-0.072***</td>
<td>-0.086***</td>
<td>-0.099***</td>
<td>-0.119***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-2.32)</td>
<td>(-3.00)</td>
<td>(-2.71)</td>
<td>(-2.50)</td>
<td>(-2.89)</td>
<td>(-2.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes. This table presents local linear regression results using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms. Results using a triangular kernel are reported. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is the natural logarithm of one plus patent counts, which measures innovation quantity. In columns (4)–(6), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus citation counts scaled by patents, which measures the quality of innovation. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. Patent data are from the NBER Patent Citation database over the 1980–2005 time period.

∗, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 6. Right-to-Work Laws

<table>
<thead>
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<th>(1)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
<td>Ln(Patents)_{i,s}</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unionization</td>
<td>States with right-to-work laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 1</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-1.45)</td>
<td>(-1.46)</td>
<td>(-1.49)</td>
<td>(-0.64)</td>
<td>(-0.90)</td>
<td>(-1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 2</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
<td>-0.089***</td>
<td>-0.098***</td>
<td>-0.091***</td>
<td>-0.135***</td>
<td>-0.148***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.27)</td>
<td>(-4.06)</td>
<td>(-4.70)</td>
<td>(-2.95)</td>
<td>(-3.82)</td>
<td>(-4.61)</td>
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<td>n = 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unionization</td>
<td>States without right-to-work laws</td>
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<tr>
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<td>n = 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>n = 3</td>
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</table>

Notes. This table presents local linear regression results using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for firms located in states with right-to-work laws versus states without right-to-work laws. Results using a triangular kernel are reported. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is the natural logarithm of one plus patent counts, which measures innovation quantity. In columns (4)–(6), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus citation counts scaled by patents, which measures the quality of innovation. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. Patent data are from the NBER Patent Citation database over the 1980–2005 time period.

∗, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
of effort, persistence, and motivation on the part of workers, innovation requires a significantly higher level of effort, persistence, and motivation on the part of employees. Unions that prevent employees from punishment for shirking (e.g., loss of job) impede innovation. Note that shirking may not be restricted only to inventors but could also occur among unionized hourly employees who serve as supporting staff, which indirectly affects inventors’ productivity. We test this conjecture by examining the change in innovation productivity of individual inventors surrounding union elections in a DiD framework.

To mitigate firm heterogeneity concerns, we first match firms that win the union election (treatment firms) with those that fail the union election (control firms) using a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching algorithm. Because we cannot observe accounting information for privately held firms, we match firms based on firm industry and union election year. We ensure that each treatment firm is matched to a unique control firm.

We collect individual inventor data from the Harvard Business School (HBS) patent and inventor database available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent. The HBS patent and inventor database provides information for both inventors (the individuals who receive credit for producing the patent) and assignees (the entity that owns the patents, which could be a government, a firm, or an individual). It provides a unique identifier for each inventor so that we are able to track the mobility of individual inventors. We define two groups of inventors. “Stayers” are inventors who produce at least one patent in the firm holding union elections both three years before and after the election year. “New hires” are inventors who produce at least one patent within three years after the union election year in the firm holding union elections, but produce at least one patent in a different firm within three years before the union election year.

Table 8 presents the DiD results. We compute the DiD estimate by first subtracting the total number of patents per inventor over the three-year period preceding the election from the total number of patents per inventor over the three-year period after the election for each control firm. The difference is then averaged over the treatment firm and reported in column (1). By doing this, we count each firm once regardless of the number of inventors it has.

To evaluate the quality of the patents, we first compute the citation ratio per inventor for each control firm by counting the total number of patents it generates three years before (or after) the union election as well as the total number of citations received by these patents, and dividing the latter by the former. We then calculate the difference in citation ratios before and after the election and average it over all control firms. We report it in column (1). We repeat the same procedure for treatment firms and report the average change in the total number of patents (citation ratios) surrounding

Table 7. R&D Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(R&amp;D/Assets), n</th>
<th>n = 1</th>
<th>n = 2</th>
<th>n = 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unionization</td>
<td>−0.006∗∗</td>
<td>−0.004∗</td>
<td>−0.006∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−2.90)</td>
<td>(−1.65)</td>
<td>(−3.79)</td>
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</table>

Notes: This table presents local linear regression results using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyaran (2012) for R&D spending. Results using a triangular kernel are reported. The dependent variable is R&D expenditures scaled by total assets in years \( t + n \) relative to the union election year. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. R&D spending and total assets are from Compustat.

∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

5.2. Inventor Productivity

A second possible mechanism leading to a decline in innovation is an increase in employee shirking because job security increases after a successful union election. As discussed before, because (unlike routine tasks) innovation is an exploration of untested approaches and the innovation process is long, risky, and idiosyncratic, innovation requires a significantly higher level of effort, persistence, and motivation on the part of inventors.
the union election year in column (2). The DiD estimate is simply the difference in differences for the treatment and the control firms, and is reported in column (3). We report the p-values of the DiD estimates in column (4).

We first compare “stayers” in treatment firms with those in matched control firms. The DiD estimator for patent counts is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that stayers of unionized firms become less innovative after the union election compared to their counterparts in nonunionized firms after the union election. The DiD estimate for patent quality is negative and significant at the 1% level, because the drop in patent quality produced by the inventors of treatment firms is significantly larger than that produced by the inventors of control firms.

Next, we compare the innovation productivity of “new hires.” The DiD estimates for both patent quantity and quality are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the inventors who newly join the unionized firms after the union elections become less innovative than those who newly join the firms that fail to unionize, compared to their own productivity in their previous firms.

Overall, the evidence presented in this subsection is consistent with the view that shirking by scientists or their supporting staff may be another possible explanation for the reduction in innovation output after union election wins.

5.3. Inventor Departures
In this subsection, we discuss a third possible underlying mechanism through which unionization impedes firm innovation: the departure of innovative employees. Although DiNardo and Lee (2004) find little evidence of the effect of unionization on average employee wages, they ignore the distribution of employee earnings. Frandsen (2012) shows that unionization substantially reduces wage gaps between the lower end and the upper tail. To the extent that innovative individuals have better job prospects and are in high demand in the labor market, reduced wage gaps due to unionization may force out innovative employees as they seek better career opportunities. This could also contribute to the reduction in innovation output after successful union elections.

To test this conjecture, we again use the inventor information obtained from the HBS patent and inventor database and define “Leavers.” Leavers are inventors who produce at least one patent in the firms holding union elections within three years before the election year and at least one patent in a different firm within three years after the election year.

The top panel of Table 9 reports the DiD results for leavers. Column (1) suggests that leavers of unionized firms on average generate a larger number of patents after the union election, whereas column (2) suggests that leavers of firms that fail to unionize on average generate fewer patents after the union election.

Table 9. Inventor Departures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treat. diff.</td>
<td>Control diff.</td>
<td>DiD (after–before)</td>
<td>(after–before)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>−1.342</td>
<td>1.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citations/Patents</td>
<td>−14.134</td>
<td>−26.066</td>
<td>11.932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. This table presents the estimation results for the effect of unionization on the departure of innovative inventors. The top panel presents DiD estimation results. The bottom panel presents RDD results. “Leavers” are inventors who produce at least one patent in firms holding union elections within three years before the election year and at least one patent in a different firm within three years after the election year. “Top leavers” are leavers that are in the top fifth percentile distribution in terms of innovation productivity three years before the election year among all inventors that depart the firm. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. Individual inventor information is from the HBS patent database. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
5.4. Response by Firms to Union Election Wins

How do firms respond to union election wins? One possibility is that firms move their innovation activities away from places where unions are formed. To test this conjecture, we consider the locality of patents (i.e., output of innovation activities) within a firm. We collect information on locations of inventors from the HBS patent and inventor database to infer where the innovation is undertaken. We capture the locality of patents by computing the percentage of local patents to total patents and local citations to total citations generated. We define local patents as the ones generated by firms in states where union elections are held and local citations as the number of future citations received by local patents.

We examine the effect of unionization on local patents and citations in a local linear RDD framework and report the results in Table 10. The coefficient estimates on Unionization are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level two and three years after union elections, suggesting that the percentage of innovation output generated in states where unions win declines significantly. This finding suggests that firms may shift their innovation activities to states where the workforce is not unionized. Note that the coefficient estimates on Unionization for one-year postelection patents and citations are negative but insignificant, consistent with the conjecture that it may take some time for firms to adjust their innovation policies geographically in response to union election wins.

Overall, we find that firms move their innovation activities away from states where union elections win. This type of behavior to some extent is consistent with Boeing’s experience in building their Dreamliner jet in South Carolina, which has more business-friendly labor laws than Washington, where its existing plants are located. In addition to production facilities, in September 2014 Boeing also announced a new R&D center to be located in South Carolina with R&D job reductions in Washington (Aitchison 2014).

Table 10. Patent Locality

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of local patents</td>
<td>% of local citations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.010 (∗∗∗)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 2</td>
<td>−0.020 (∗∗∗)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>−0.018 (∗∗∗)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 3</td>
<td>−0.025 (∗∗∗)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.025 (∗∗∗)</td>
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</table>

Notes: This table presents local linear regression results using the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is the percentage of patents generated in states where union elections are held scaled by all the patents generated by the firm. In columns (4)–(6), the dependent variable is the percentage of citations received by patents generated in states where union elections are held scaled by all citations received by the patents generated by the firm. Union election results are from the NLRB over 1980–2002. Patent data are from the NBER Patent Citation database over the 1980–2005 time period.
6. Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the effect of unionization on the innovation activities of firms. We find that patent counts and citations decline significantly after firms elect to unionize. Economically, passing a union election leads to an 8.7% decline in patent counts and a 12.5% decline in the number of citations per patent three years after the election. We provide a battery of diagnostic and robustness tests and find that our conclusions are unchanged. Next, we show that the results are statistically insignificant in states with right-to-work legislation where unions have less bargaining power to expropriate rents. A reduction in R&D expenditures, reduced productivity of existing and newly hired inventors, and the departure of innovative individuals appear as plausible underlying mechanisms through which unionization impedes innovation. Finally, in response to unionization, we find that firms move their innovation activities away from states where union elections win.

Although we show a negative effect of unions on innovation using the regression discontinuity approach, one needs to use caution when interpreting and generalizing our results because of some limitations of the RDD. First, although the RDD has strong local validity, it has weak external validity. Therefore, the negative effect of unions on innovation may only apply to firms that fall in a narrow band of vote shares around the cutoff. For firms in which unions overwhelmingly win or lose the elections, we cannot establish the effect of unionization on innovation. Second, there might be a selection issue for firms that choose to hold or not hold union elections. Because our focus is on the firms that hold union elections and we explore how barely passing or failing the election affects firm innovation, our setting is not subject to this selection problem. However, our findings cannot answer the question of whether holding a union election would affect innovation. Third, the political science literature (e.g., Snyder 2005, Caughey and Sekhon 2011) has shown that substantial imbalance near the threshold that distinguishes winners from losers may create “strategic sorting” around the election threshold and bias the results. In other words, some firm observable attributes appear to be significantly correlated with victory even in very close elections. Although we have shown that this is not the case in our setting because ex ante characteristics of publicly traded firms that barely pass and fail the union elections are comparable, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results are driven by strategic sorting because we do not observe attributes of privately held firms falling in the small margin around the cutoff because of data limitations.

Our study has important implications for policy makers when they alter union regulations or labor laws to encourage innovation, which is perhaps the most important driver of economic growth. Our paper also highlights the importance of blue-collar workers in the innovation process, which has been generally ignored by the previous literature but has received more interest and attention as of late.

Finally, although a fast-growing literature has provided empirical evidence supporting the implications of Manso (2011) that tolerance for failure is necessary for motivating innovation (e.g., Bernstein 2015, Ederer and Manso 2013, Tian and Wang 2014), our paper shows that one cannot ignore the importance of the other side of the story, namely, that agents need to be rewarded for success in the long run. Labor unions are a good example of contract arrangements that tolerate failure in the short term but do not reward success in the long run, and hence impede innovation. Our research calls for future studies that explore contract designs that combine both short-term failure tolerance and long-term reward for success and that best nurture firm innovation.

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Appendix. Variable Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unionization</td>
<td>An indicator variable that equals one if a majority of employees votes for unionization in a given election and zero if a majority of employees votes against unionization in a given election.</td>
<td>NLRB and Thomas J. Holmes website (<a href="http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/geo_spill/">http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/geo_spill/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote for union</td>
<td>Total number of votes for unionization divided by total votes for unionization in a given election.</td>
<td>NLRB and Thomas J. Holmes website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage</td>
<td>An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is unionized as a result of an election and zero otherwise.</td>
<td>NLRB and Thomas J. Holmes website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents</td>
<td>Total number of patents filed (and eventually granted) by a firm in a year.</td>
<td>NBER Patent Citation database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citations/Patents</td>
<td>Total number of citations divided by the number of patents.</td>
<td>NBER Patent Citation database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>Book value of assets at the end of fiscal year [#6].</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>The ratio of book value to market value of equity [#60/(#25+#199)].</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROA</td>
<td>Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets [#13/#6].</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPE/Assets</td>
<td>Property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets [#8/#6].</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capx/Assets</td>
<td>Capital expenditure divided by total assets [#128/#6].</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt/Assets</td>
<td>Book value of debt divided by total assets [#9+#34]/#6.</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm age</td>
<td>Firm age calculated by the difference between the first year that a firm appeared in Compustat and the current year.</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHI</td>
<td>Herfindahl–Hirschman index based on the firm’s sales in a given four-digit SIC industry.</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D/Assets</td>
<td>Research and development expenditure divided by total assets [#46/#6].</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayers</td>
<td>Inventors who produce at least one patent in the firm holding union elections both three years before and after the election year.</td>
<td>HBS patent and inventor database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New hires</td>
<td>Inventors who produce at least one patent within three years after the union election year in the firm holding union elections and also at least one patent within three years in a different firm before the union election year.</td>
<td>HBS patent and inventor database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leavers</td>
<td>Inventors who produce at least one patent in the firms holding union elections within three years before the election year and at least one patent in a different firm within three years after the union election year.</td>
<td>HBS patent and inventor database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top leavers</td>
<td>Leavers that are in the top fifth percentile distribution of innovation productivity three years before the election year among all inventors that depart the firm.</td>
<td>HBS patent and inventor database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Endnotes

1 For example, D’Acunto (2014) shows that basic education of the blue-collar workforce has a significant impact on the innovation efficiency of manufacturing firms.

2 These laws provide employees with greater protection than employment at will, where employees can be terminated with or without just cause.

3 Although there are likely merits to both sides of these arguments, there is an unmistakable trend in unionization rates in the United States: they have lost their luster. In 1954, Mayer (2004) reports that union membership in the United States peaked at just over 28% of all employed workers. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, by 2014, total union membership stood at just above 11.1%, with 6.6% of private sector employees unionized.

4 In fact, a recent paper by Cohen et al. (2013) suggests that two firms with the same level of R&D can have very divergent innovation production paths. In addition, R&D expenditures only capture one particular observable quantitative input (Aghion et al. 2013) and are sensitive to accounting norms such as whether it should be capitalized or expensed (Acharya and Subramanian 2009). Thus, R&D spending may not be a reliable proxy for innovation.

5 Indiana, which borders Michigan to the south, passed similar legislation a year earlier. Linn (2012) provides a discussion on the potential impact on other non-right-to-work states.

6 Steven Wedge (CFO, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas) and Bob Preston (VP Manufacturing, ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas), in discussion with the authors, September 21, 2013.

7 In a controlled laboratory experiment, Ederer and Manso (2013) provide evidence consistent with the prediction of Manso (2011).

8 The union election sample ends in 2002 to allow for postelection innovation output information available in the NBER Patent Citation database, which provides patent information up to 2006.

10 We keep the first election and eliminate those elections occurred within the subsequent three years because our main focus is on firm innovation output within the first three years after the election.
11 Because our union election sample ends in 2002 and we examine innovation output up to three years after the election, the patent and citation sample ends in 2005.
12 Lee (2008) shows that, even in the presence of manipulation, as long as firms do not have precise control over the forcing variable, an exogenous discontinuity still allows for random assignment to the treatment.
13 See http://econlab.berkeley.edu/~jmccrary/DCdensity for a detailed discussion of the algorithm.
14 Although our sample periods are different, DiNardo and Lee (2004) also find little evidence of precise manipulation of union votes around the 50% threshold, which is consistent with our findings.
15 The choice of the bin width reflects a trade-off discussed in Imbens and Lemieux (2008). The bin width needs to be large enough to have a sufficient amount of precision so that the plots look smooth on either side of the threshold, but small enough to make the jump around the threshold clear. We use alternative bin widths and get similar results from both plots and regressions.
16 Note that, although four-digit SIC codes are available for public firms from Compustat, the NLRB database only provides SIC codes at the three-digit level for private firms. Hence, we include three-digit SIC industry fixed effects in the regressions.
17 As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) point out, the choice of kernel typically has little impact on estimation in practice. The statistics literature has also shown that a triangular kernel is optimal for estimating local linear regressions at the boundary, because it puts more weight on observations closer to the cutoff point.
18 For completeness, we estimate Equation (1) using OLS but rely on the sample of publicly traded firms that have firm characteristics data available. We estimate the regression with year and firm fixed effects. These untabulated results also suggest that unionization is negatively related to innovation.
19 States with right-to-work legislation as of 2002 (our union election sample end year) include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
20 See Li et al. (2014) for details about the HBS patent and inventor database.

References